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But you, oh, cruel men!  Who forces you to shed 
blood?  Behold the wealth of good things about 
you, the fruits yielded by the earth, the wealth 
of field and vineyard; the animals gave their 
milk for your drink and their fleece for your 
clothing.  What more do you ask?  What 
madness compels you to commit such murders, 
when you have already more than you can eat 
or drink? 
 
– Rousseau’s translation of Plutarch1 
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1 Introduction2 
There is little doubt that the thought of Peter Singer has had a profound effect on 
both the status of moral thinking and its relation to issues in applied ethics, but 
the aim of this paper is to depart from considerations in the realm of practical 
thought in order to investigate a deeper theoretical tension which underpins the 
whole edifice.  The argument shall concentrate on the convergence of his 
prescriptivist meta-ethics and his redefinition of equality as equal consideration 
of interests.  On the one hand, Singer holds the meta-ethical position of 
prescriptivism: equality does not correspond to a state of affairs, it is an ideal 
which determines moral experience; whereas, on the other, he argues that 
equality has to be extended and granted to all those beings which have interests.  
This second assumption appears to ground equality in a state of affairs or 
empirical facts about the world which Singer’s meta-ethical assertion denies.  
Supposedly, this is based in the procedural requirement of impartiality which 
Singer, like Hare before him, argues leads to a substantial utilitarian position.3   
 
This article aims to demonstrate that there exists a recognition in Singer’s 
thought of a second source of substantial obligations, that is the moral fabric of a 
particular society, and that his full ethical position draws upon a position similar 
to Hegelian absolute idealism.  The main claims that will be made are that the 
procedural constraint of impartiality does not necessarily lead to, or even favours, 
a utilitarian ethics and that Singer is implicitly aware that social conditions 
determine the nature of our moral obligations, especially the substantial content 
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of those that fulfil the requirement of equality.  And, most importantly, if abstract 
values such as equality cannot regulate behaviour without substantial 
constraints and if these substantial constraints are not universal but rely on a 
social context, then this will make a significant and perhaps revolutionary 
difference to Singer’s own normative commitments.4 
2 Singer’s prescriptivism 
The concern of much of Singer’s thinking, and the guiding theme of Practical 
Ethics, is equality.  Central to moral and political thought of the late twentieth 
century is the presupposition that all humans are equal and the principle itself 
has taken on the aspect of self-certainty; it has become a bedrock of moral 
thinking.  Yet, it is not self-evident and it needs to be extrapolated in fuller terms.  
This extrapolation occurs with the posing of the simple question: what does the 
word equality refer to in the assertion that ‘all humans are equal?’  In what 
respect are humans equal? 
 
Singer, in his response to this demand, is firstly at pains to demonstrate what 
equality is not.  Equality is not a moral judgement which corresponds to a state of 
affairs.  If all humans are equal consisted in a fact about the identity between 
humans then a moral principle would have to surmount very telling challenges.  
First, and most simply, humans are not identical, they are different shapes, sizes, 
possess different talents and abilities, et cetera.  Since humans are not equal in 
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this respect, why are we not entitled to treat them differently corresponding to 
their differences?   
 
One possible answer is that pluralities of individuals can only be used to infer 
facts about pluralities of individuals and not about particular individuals.  So, 
although men are on average physically stronger than women, one is unable to 
say on the basis of this statistical fact that this particular man is stronger than 
that particular woman. And so any characteristic supposedly inferred from a 
group (such as a person’s race, gender or religion) cannot supply any morally 
relevant information about a particular person.  Therefore, in saying that all 
humans are equal, we grant them the same rights irrespective of their cultural 
and genetic origins.  It would be unjust for an individual’s opportunities to be 
either increased or limited simply due to a statistical fact about the race, gender 
or creed to which he or she belongs. 
 
However, even though such a principle will seemingly rule out unequal and unfair 
treatment across the races and genders, it will not be able to criticise a society in 
which the populace is divided into those with an IQ above 100 and those with an 
IQ below 100, with greater rights and better opportunities being granted to those 
in the first class.  Here, we are not inferring a fact about an individual from a 
plurality of individuals, but treating each person as an individual.  The problem is 
that this defence of the principle of equality is still tied to the assumption that 
equality is based, in some sense, on a state of affairs which holds with regard to 
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individuals.  Here it is obvious that intelligence is being used as that feature of 
the world which is morally relevant.  Hence humans are more valuable than 
animals because they are more intelligent.  However, if this is the basis of the 
principle of equality, then our fictional society above is consistent with it.  If we 
lower the threshold of intelligence, not only are we being arbitrary, but the lowest 
common denominator which would include children, the least intellectually 
endowed adults, the intellectually disadvantaged and so on, will not be able to 
rule out the inclusion of, at least, the higher animals.  Such a conclusion would 
be repeated if we were to replace intelligence with language-possession, 
consciousness, moral personality, et cetera.  What motivates us to extend the 
principle to all humans and to simultaneously exclude all animals?  So when we 
say that animals are inferior to us, we cannot say because they lack a certain 
relevant characteristic (language possession, reason, et cetera) or do not have a 
relevant characteristic to the required degree (intelligence) because this can never 
rule out a political community which embodies this fact into a social hierarchy 
and involves a high redefinition of the term human in ‘all humans are equal.’ 
 
Singer’s point here is simple: if the principle of equality is tied to some supposed 
actual equality amongst humans, that is some state of affairs which obtains in 
the world, then this does not rule out certain unequal societies, nor does it 
exclude some species of animals from equal consideration.  These arguments 
have been hurriedly presented mainly because they are rather straightforward 
and thoroughly covered by Singer himself.5  Given the first of these problems, 
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Singer is not content to champion the rights of animals on such a basis; viz., the 
idea that ‘human’ cannot be defined in empirical terms when used in moral 
prescriptions that will not exclude the higher animals.  Instead he believes the 
principle of equality cannot and should not be based on a judgement which 
supposedly corresponds to a state of affairs, if it were then the principle all 
humans are equal could become self-contradictory without a high redefinition of 
what a human is.  Such a redefinition would be arbitrary, all true humans are x 
(where x can be replaced with: have an IQ over 100, and so on) is as arbitrary as, 
say, x is male, or x is of a certain race. 
 
If equality is not tied to a state of affairs, then when one states the principle ‘All 
humans are equal’ what is one actually asserting according to Singer?  The 
answer to this question is to be found in his meta-ethical position.  He defines 
agents who live by ethical standards as those who ‘believe, for any reason, that it 
is right to do as they are doing…  The notion of living according to ethical 
standards is tied up with the notion of defending the way one is living, of giving a 
reason for it, of justifying it.’6  The commitment to, at least, a minimal ethical 
code reveals that Singer wishes to hold on to the rational nature of moral 
discourse: moral judgements can be defended, debated and rejected and also be 
logically connected because they are ruled by reason-giving.  More importantly, 
such reasons have to justify my action in such a way that you too recognise the 
motivating power of such a reason.  Self-regarding motives can explain an act but 
cannot justify an act ethically: an ethical reason is one which is as acceptable to 
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you as it is to me.  Therefore, for a reason to be ethical it cannot refer to the 
particularity of the agent or the situation, ethical reasons are reasons for 
whomever, wherever and whenever; they must – to put it simply – be universal. 
 
Implicit to Singer’s position is the requirement of impartiality: a reason to be a 
moral reason must be impartial in the sense of not treating one person or group 
(including oneself) differently from another unless there is a morally good reason 
to do so.  This requirement is derived from the demand of universality.  In order 
to be certain that one’s reason is impartial, one ought to imaginatively take the 
position of all those who would be affected by one’s action and ask whether one 
would accept the justification.  This is what rules out egoism at the outset and 
also grounds equality in impartiality: when one asks whether this reason is as 
acceptable to an other as it is to oneself, one imagines oneself in a dialogue with a 
moral partner and a partner who demands one’s respect.  
 
Hence, Singer’s own meta-ethical position clearly echoes Hare’s principal task of 
reconciling the antinomy between the freedom to form one’s own moral opinions 
and the aspiration that moral discourse be rational in nature.7  And their 
solution is also the same: equality is not a descriptive statement that corresponds 
to some reality but a prescriptive one.  Prescriptivism is expressed in the 
assertion of three features of moral discourse: moral judgements are prescrip
moral judgements differ from other prescriptive statements through 
tive; 
being 
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universalisable; and, finally, there can exist logical relations between prescriptive 
judgements. 
 
To make sense of equality, one has to give up the belief that in stating that all 
humans as equal one is representing some fact about the world.  Singer sees this 
as crucial in order to avoid, on the one hand, a high redefinition of the meaning of 
human in order to exclude non-human animals, and, on the other, social orders 
which are consistent with the fact of equality but contradict our intuition of what 
equality should be: 
We can reject this ‘hierarchy of intelligence’ and similar fantastic 
schemes only if we are clear that the claim to equality does not rest on 
the possession of intelligence, moral personality, rationality, or similar 
matters of fact.  There is no logically compelling reason for assuming 
that a difference in ability between two people justifies any difference in 
the amount of consideration we give to their interests.  Equality is a 
basic ethical principle, not an assertion of fact.8 
So, equality for Singer is a ‘basic ethical principle’ which he will also describe as: 
‘Equality is a moral ideal, not a simple assertion of fact… The principle of equality 
of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality among 
humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat humans.’9  Equality is a 
prescription, in stating the principle ‘all humans are equal’ one does not describe 
a state of affairs but prescribes the way in which one’s behaviour towards other 
humans has to be regulated.  Equality is an axiomatic principle which makes 
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policies such as freedom of opportunity rational.  As an axiomatic principle, it 
structures the way in which one makes moral judgements and it can be quite 
accurately characterised as a category of moral knowledge which makes moral 
judgements possible.  In this way, no matter the actual differences between 
individuals, races, creeds and genders, the principle dictates equal treatment. 
3 Singer’s equation of equality with equal considerations of interests 
So the statement ‘all humans are equal’ is not a description of a morally relevant 
fact somehow discoverable in the world, it is a prescription which determines and 
regulates the behaviour of agents.  It is a cornerstone of moral thinking: there 
would be some comprehensible logical progression from this principle to 
substantial rights of individuals, such as employment laws.  However, there is an 
obvious problem for any prescriptivist: if ‘all humans are equal’ is not tied in 
some way to a characteristic or ability, and it is a moral principle which is 
imposed upon the world by the thinking mind in order to have moral experience, 
then how can we decide between ‘all humans are equal’ and ‘all white, males are 
equal’ since the assertion is in no way ruled by input from the world?  With a 
principle of equality tied to some feature of the world, one can see the injustice in 
excluding women from certain rights and opportunities because they lack 
reasoning skills, higher thought powers, the proper faculty of judgement, or are 
too stupid.  It is unjust because it is flatly false.  Ditto applied to any specific 
race.  However, this simplicity is not available to a prescriptivist because 
prescriptions are not tied to facts about the world.  Why is it that my experience 
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ruled by ‘all white males are equal’ is inconsistent or not logical in a way that any 
moral experience ruled by the principle ‘all humans are equal’ is not?  The 
prescriptivist is able to show how moral statements are logically consistent with 
one another, but unlike a moral realist, there is no way to justify those bedrock 
axioms such as equality, liberty, et cetera.  These are to be taken as self-evident, 
but why is it that ‘all humans are equal’ is granted this status whereas ‘all white, 
males are equal’ is not? 
 
According to Singer, these axiomatic statements must be rationally justifiable, 
that is they must be capable of being either defended or rejected.  His method 
involves a two-step process whereby the statement ‘all humans are equal’ is 
dependent on a rational reconstruction of its substantial content, and those 
moral intuitions which confirm or obstruct this reconstruction are refined using, 
for want of a better term, deconstruction.  In other words, he attempts to derive 
rational constraints for the principle of equality from the requirement of 
impartiality, and then he wants to show that the counter-intuitive nature of the 
consequences of this reconstruction are due to irrational and arbitrary features of 
one’s set of socially formed moral judgements and not due to the redefinition of 
the principle itself. 
 
The rational reconstruction of the definition of x in the axiom ‘all x are equal’ 
begins from the rationally defensible considered moral judgement that all 
humans are equal and the requirements of impartiality.  The first step involves 
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imagining oneself as a member of a disadvantaged group and to see whether, as a 
member of that group, one will accept the reason given as justifying the action 
which affects one.  Imagination requires recognition of the individual or group as 
a possible moral partner whether in actual discourse or by proxy.  This way the 
universal nature of equality is respected and extended to children, the mentally 
disadvantaged, the mute, small countries in unfair bargaining positions in the 
global political sphere, et cetera.  The only inclusive principle of equality is equal 
consideration of interests, but this does not, of course, rule out non-human 
beings with interests.  For an action to be morally justifiable, then all those 
interests which are affected by it must be considered.  Singer’s point is simple: as 
a member of the group of males, I accept that the right of abortion need not be 
extended to me as such an extension has no effect on my interests, but as a 
woman I may feel that the right to vote is a right which equality demands on my 
behalf due to the satisfaction or frustration of my interests.  As a member of 
another species, it is difficult to imagine that I would be prepared to suffer and 
die just so that a human mouth may have the pleasure of tasting my flesh.  This 
is nothing but the demand that reasons, if they are to be regarded as ethical, 
must be universalisable, which is to say that they must be acceptable to 
whomever they will affect.  Singer believes that the universal aspect of ethics 
provides a persuasive reason for a minimal utilitarianism: ‘In accepting that 
ethical judgments must be made from a universal point of view, I am accepting 
that my own interests cannot, simply because they are my interests, count more 
than the interests of anyone else.  Thus my very natural concern that my own 
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interests be looked after must, when I think ethically, be extended to the interests 
of others.’10  So, the rational reconstruction of the principle of equality given the 
requirements of impartiality leads to its redefinition as a principle of equal 
consideration of interests. 
 
However, such a new principle seems counter-intuitive in that it jars against 
some of the central moral givens of our ethical tradition; most obviously, it levels 
off the claims made on one by humans and non-human animals.  This is where 
Singer seeks to revise these moral judgements through the process of the 
deconstruction of our traditional distinction between species.  He never tires of 
mentioning that the main reason one is loathe to extend the principle of equality 
to members of other species in the same way that is has been extended, through 
history and progress, to women and members of other races, is based on a 
putative assumption.   
 
Given the stark presentation of the application of the principle of equality, why is 
it that thinkers are reluctant to extend it to members of other species?  The 
reason, according to Singer, is that there exists a putative prejudice embodied in 
the ontological distinction between humans and animals.  The word ‘animal’ 
carries linguistic baggage: it divides things off and places a privilege on humans.  
Language, in dividing the world into humans and animals, creates an ontological 
duality in which one is at home when one thinks that there is an insurmountable 
difference between the two things and it makes one think that the there is also a 
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difference in value.  It is for this reason that Singer’s method has been termed a 
form of deconstruction.  Deconstruction identifies a conventional linguistic 
duality: human/animal; duty/charity; and speech/writing and seeks to 
demonstrate that philosophy is often guilty of privileging one of the terms over the 
other and arbitrarily assigning a value to it.  Yet, interrogation would reveal that 
such a privilege is nothing but a linguistic echo that has been rhetorically and 
not rationally transformed, due to metaphysical error, into an ontological and 
evaluative distinction.  No good reason can be offered for the privileging of one 
term over the other, instead the value distinction relies on a convention embodied 
in language that seems intuitive to the agent who utters the statement.  The 
arbitrariness is often disclosed in the contradictory nature of these terms, such 
as “human” which means both “not animal”, “better than animal” yet also a 
particular species of animal.11  Humans are animals, the word means animals of 
the species Homo sapiens, but language – rhetoric – is doing the arguing rather 
than any reason.  One assumes a human has more value than an animal 
because of a linguistic echo. The fact that the decision to choose one dominate 
meaning over another is not made on rational grounds, but that it is done on the 
basis of presupposition and prejudice, makes the decision arbitrary; even if one 
can genealogically explain how it came about, one cannot morally justify it.  There 
exists a reason, but it is found to be not a good reason when interrogated. 
 
The deconstructive method coupled with the reconstructive requirement of 
impartiality proceeds by demanding that the disclosure of this arbitrary linguistic 
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opposition can no longer regulate the prescription of equality.  The principle of 
equality can be stated that all x are equal where we have to offer a definition of x.  
In the past, one would have offered men, or white men, but such a choice is 
revealed by internal (civil rights and feminist movements) and external (the moral 
status of members of other races and countries) inconsistencies to be rationally 
unsupportable and merely an institutional prejudice.  Hence, the most widely 
accepted form of the principle is all humans are equal, but it has been shown 
that even if there are differences between humans, it should not affect our 
principle of equality.  Once one realises that there are differences between 
animals, but no essential ontological difference between humans and non-human 
animals, one needs to show where the principle of equality no longer applies.  The 
arbitrary border between human animals and non-human animals – like that 
which existed in the past between the genders and races – is shown to have no 
justification except an institutional, traditional or, to put it another way, 
customary one.  The demand is for a rational rather than a mere explanatory 
justification. 
 
One cannot deny that there are important difference between humans and 
members of other species, but we need to ask whether such differences lead to 
different moral consideration.  The differences may give rise to different rights, 
but this does not rule out equal consideration.  Singer’s aim is to redraw the 
boundaries of equality along a more rational line.  His basic assumption, then, is 
that the only principle of equality which embraces all human beings with all their 
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differences is the principle of equal consideration of interests.  Thus, the division 
of the world into those things with which we are concerned with and those things 
which do not concern us – that is, the definition of the set of actual or proxy 
moral partners – cannot be rationally drawn along the line of species since this 
would be to embody a linguistic prejudice.  For Singer, equality depends on 
interests: the world has to be divided into things with interests and things which 
have no interests and a moral agent has to be concerned with the former.  Those 
things which have interests are those things which can suffer.  However, this 
cannot be rationally limited to humans alone, it must be extended to include 
members of other species, most notably non-human animals. 
 
Yet, it is here that a contradiction becomes apparent.  The demand for equality is 
a prescription for Singer, it does not represent a state of affairs.  However, if this 
is the case how is it that ‘all humans are equal’ is a better prescription than ‘all 
white, males are equal’?  Singer’s answer is that the only relevant characteristic is 
not colour, gender, intelligence, or moral personality but whether a being has 
interests or not.  Women and non-white humans have interests so they must be 
treated equally.  As do animals.  So the most rational principle, for Singer, is ‘all 
beings with interests are equal’.  This begins to sound as though Singer is now 
offering some feature of the world which justifies the distinction between things 
we are concerned about and things we are not which is hard to balance with the 
assertion that equality is a prescription not a description.  It is not clear how 
descriptive statements make a difference to prescriptive ones and, for this reason, 
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one needs to return to and to flesh out Singer’s meta-ethical position and the 
requirements of impartiality. 
4 Squaring the circle: Hegelianism 
The philosophical position of prescriptivism is purely formal and there is no 
formal reason why “all humans are equal” is a more rational prescription than 
“all white males are equal” without substantial constraints that determine its 
content.  Singer attempts to derive substantial constraints on the content of 
prescriptions through the requirement of impartiality, which, for him, favours a 
minimal utilitarian stance, if not – as he admits – necessarily entailing it.12  
However, the requirement of impartiality does not led to utilitarianism but merely 
to the recognition that all interests affected by the action count equally.  This is 
the traditional Benthamite ad hoc addition to utilitarian theory and not a 
consequence of adopting it.  In asking who is to count as a moral partner and 
what one is to count as interests remains formal until utilitarianism is fed into 
the equation.  In other words, for Singer, impartiality and its interpretation as 
equality is prior to utilitarianism.  To fully understand the move from formal 
prescriptions to substantial obligations, it is necessary to defend a rather 
startling claim: Singer can be characterised in two important aspects as a 
Hegelian. 
 
There are several points to be made in support of such a peculiar claim.  First, 
Hegel himself characterises fully rational moral (and political) judgements in the 
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society of developed moral personality as ruled by the prescription of equality: 
‘Personality contains in general the capacity for right and constitutes the (itself 
abstract) basis of abstract and hence formal right.  The commandment of right is 
therefore: be a person and respect others as persons.’13  However, this in itself 
may be nothing more than a seductive echo as many thinkers have based their 
moral systems on the principle of equality and Hegel is as aware as Burke of the 
emptiness of abstract right if it is not tied to cultural and social requirements of 
what rights actually demand.14  Furthermore, equality for Hegel is dependent on 
moral personality, or freedom, which he denies to animals, children and nations 
at a different point in ‘history.’  The point of coincidence here, though, concerns 
Singer’s embodiment of two crucial aspects of a Hegelian ethic: (1) the idea of 
progress and (2) the dialectic of absolute (as opposed to normal) idealism. 
 
(1) The first element which reflects a latent Hegelianism in Singer’s meta-ethical 
position is the embodiment of progress in the moral sciences.  Singer holds that 
having shown that there can be no rational justification for the continued 
existence of the meat industry, he assumes that the only thing which supports it 
is the conservatism of custom.  In one quotation we are offered an interesting 
parallel between our own customs and the customs of the past: 
The decision to cease giving it that support may be difficult, but it is no 
more difficult than it would have been for a white Southerner to go 
against the traditions of his society and free his slaves, if we do not 
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change our dietary habits, how can we censure those slave-holders who 
would not change their own way of living?15 
Coupled with this he offers us the assertion that ‘Eskimos living in an 
environment where they must kill animals for food or starve might be justified in 
claiming that their interest in surviving overrides that of the animals they kill.’16  
For Hegel, moral categories and concepts, axiomatic prescriptions such as 
equality and freedom, are necessary in order for the subject to have moral 
experience.  However, as abstract concepts they are too formal to dictate 
substantial obligations and these can only arise from the content of a specific way 
of life.  The formal requirement of universality can exclude only systems of 
thought that explicitly reject the central value of equality and those which are 
egoist in nature but it cannot determine the substantial content of obligations.  
This is possible only if a description of what is good (interests, welfare, respect) is 
offered.  So, one can formally state equality for all, but substantially one must say 
what equality entails (opportunity, respect, resources, etc.) and to whom it is to 
be extended (members of my nation, human beings, rational agents).  Hegel’s 
point is that this will be supplied by or be a product of my social context or moral 
fabric and not the workings of practical or pure reason.17 
 
Yet, this is not relativism since these ways of life which supply one’s moral 
obligations may become inconsistent when new moral problems cannot be 
adequately articulated or comprehended by the existing moral structures of 
experience, as happened with Antigone who had to navigate the conflicting 
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obligations brought about by her allegiance to the family when the state trumped 
these very duties.18  Inconsistencies between the moral categories and the 
substantial content of a way of life can arise internally (Antigone) or externally 
(the collision of cultures: the Aztecs and Cortés), but progress occurs due to these 
conflicts.  Therefore, whereas for the Inuit, there is no real conflict between killing 
animals and equality, since to grant equality to the seals would involve 
substantial suffering for the tribe, for contemporary, western society, the 
principle becomes critical because there is no longer any necessary reason to 
cause the suffering induced by the meat industry.   Re-definition of concepts 
occurs when made possible by the process of historical development and not out 
of joint with it. 
 
(2) And this embodied idea of progress makes no sense without at least some 
minimal appropriation of Hegelian absolute idealism.  Simple prescriptivism with 
its drive towards universalism alone cannot explain Singer’s acceptance of the 
relationship between the world and moral prescriptions.  The way to make sense 
of such a stance is in Hegel’s enigmatic aphorism which somehow embodies the 
difference between normal idealism and absolute idealism: ‘What is rational is 
actual;/ and what is actual is rational.’19  Prescriptivism, like idealism, holds that 
certain axiomatic principles prescribe the way in which moral judgements are to 
be made, they structure the subject’s experience.  Normal idealism holds that 
intuitions are the content of experience but that experience is structured by the 
subject.  This corresponds to the second part of the aphorism, the actual has to 
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be rational in order to be experienced.  Hegelian absolute idealism differs in that 
not only does the content of experience have to have a rational structure, but the 
rational structure of the mind must correspond to the real structures of reality: 
what is rational has to be actual.20  (Put flippantly, an agent can freely impose 
another theory of gravity on the world and this will allow him to have consistent 
experience, but it might hinder him when he wants to walk off a cliff or build an 
aeroplane.)  The difference between what has been termed normal idealism and 
absolute idealism hinges upon the relationship between intuitions and knowing; 
with the former, intuitions are passive and knowing active, with the latter, 
intuitions and knowing are in a reciprocally active relationship. 
 
A moral principle is not a simple assertion, but a prescription – it determines the 
way in which the knowing subject structures experience.  For Hegel, this is a 
reciprocal process: our categories of understanding must be adequate for us to 
labour in the world, and reciprocally the world has to live up to our categories – 
especially the moral ones.  His idealism is described as absolute because one day 
the subject’s categories of knowing will adequately fit the world and the world will 
have been made rational, by labour, in order to correspond to such categories.  
This, in brief, is the end of history thesis.  Human action, through the creation 
and refinement of social institutions and practices, moulds the world to fit the 
requirements of moral demands and values (a constitutional commitment to 
equality), whereas the interests of groups and individuals mould the rationality of 
these institutions to fit the demands of the world (the demands by civil rights 
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movements for the extension of such a commitment to all those who are not 
excluded arbitrarily, viz. non-rationally).  Singer is obviously involved in a similar 
project: he wants to demonstrate that the institutions and the practices of the 
contemporary world do not live up to the principle of equality and are, therefore, 
not rational. 
 
Singer’s meta-ethical position can, therefore, be characterised as a prescriptivist, 
but one who takes seriously the absolute idealist’s postulation of a relationship 
between the rational structures of moral experience and the institutions and 
practices of the social world which embody and give content to these rational 
structures.  For Singer, the crucial relationship is between the prescription of 
equality and the rational basis of this in the fact that it has to be based on the 
minimal condition that things are granted equality when we are concerned with 
them.  Those things with which we can be rationally concerned are those that 
actually have interests and suffer when those interests are thwarted.  Equal 
consideration of interests is consistent with prescriptivism only on the basis of a 
minimal Hegelianism which allows for a relationship between rationality and 
actuality. 
5 The rationality of axiomatic prescriptions 
Singer has to demonstrate that there is a choice between the principle of equality 
which extends across all species and the principle of equality applied only to 
humans and that to choose the latter is arbitrary and, although it can be 
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explained, such explication will give us no reasons why such a principle is 
justified.  Instead of the distinction between humans and animals, another 
distinction which will fit the definition of the principle all x are equal needs to be 
offered.  Singer will offer: equal considerations of interests as his moral 
prescription.  Why though is this not yet another arbitrary choice? 
 
The difference between arbitrariness and rationality is, for Singer, to be marked 
by impartiality: if equality is a moral ideal, a way in which we structure the world 
as moral beings, then it is irrational when it privileges the interests of a specific 
group for no good moral reason.  Our concern for others, according to Singer, 
does not depend upon what they are like or what abilities they possess, even if 
that is moral personality, although these various characteristics will determine 
what our concern requires us to do; for example, abortion rights for women are 
based on a deeper principle of liberty which men share but the latter do not 
require the right.  So, if our concern for others does not depend on any actual 
equality or any inherent characteristics, what allows us to divide things in the 
world into those with which we are concerned and those which do not concern 
us?  Singer’s answer is not unfamiliar: one should be concerned with those 
beings who suffer since to be able to suffer is the precondition to having interests 
at all. 
 
Singer here offers his own relationship between the requirements of reason and 
the constraints of the world.  There is the element of idealism in the demand that 
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the world be rational (the world should exhibit some feature which justifies the 
concept of equality), but the realism that tempers the actuality of the principle of 
equality is to be found in the minimal requirement of impartiality.  For the 
principle to bite, it must somehow reflect an actual way of the world: in having 
interests, I wish to satisfy them.  If you stop me from doing so, then you must 
give me a damn good reason why.  Hence, this demand for impersonal 
universality is embodied in the interests of beings.  The lowest common 
denominator which embodies the principle of equality is the demand that those 
who have interests be considered equal, no matter what the differences in those 
interests may be. Equal considerations of interests is more rational than ‘All 
humans are equal’ because the cost of excluding animals is to exclude the 
mentally disadvantaged, children, small countries, et cetera.  Different beings 
have different rights because of their status, but once we recognise that a thing 
has interests then the onus is on us as moral beings to either satisfy or deny 
those interests.  Therefore, instead of the ontological distinction between humans 
and animals, the world for the purposes of equal and non-equal things is to be 
divided into beings with interests and beings with no interests. 
 
However, all talk of impartiality rests upon the recognition of beings as either to 
be considered or not to be considered and, thus, the ontological question is prior 
to the ethical one.  Impartiality certainly does not entail utilitarianism and does 
not favour it unless one already assumes the recognition of those beings with 
interests as the relevant ethical one.21  This can clearly be seen in Singer’s own 
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extension of the principle of equality.  Formally, all x are equal, and substantially 
all beings who have interests demand consideration.  Yet, if he were consistent 
with the pure rational requirements of his account, then he could not make the 
claims that Inuit are justified (not just intelligible) in eating seals or that we 
ourselves are justified (not just intelligible) in eating plants.22  Both seals and 
plants have interests.23  Oddly, Singer agrees with common sense morality and 
contradicts his own consistency in claiming that the Inuit ought to use the seals 
and we ought to use plants. 
 
Material and social conditions need to be appropriate in order for recognition to 
be granted to other species.  And where does recognition come from?  Inuit see 
animals as tools due to economic necessity as we see plants as tools – a 
necessary means to survival.  This trumps moral concerns and means that any 
extension of moral peerage – no matter what the denominator of equality is – 
would be rational, but not actual as Hegel would say.24  Given our technological 
level and social structures, a rational extension of the principle to plants could 
not meet the constraints of actuality.  This is analogous to the concerns of the 
Inuit.  It is arguable that the use of animals as tools can, however, be superseded 
and animal rights is, perhaps, for good reason solely a bourgeois pursuit of the 
educated classes in the West (although I do not wish to undermine its rationality 
for that group). 
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In the opening quotation to this article, Plutarch rightly recognises that necessity 
can determine the scope of moral obligations and this is the same Hegelian 
demand that what is rational be actual.  The Inuit have to eat seals, they have no 
plants.  If we were to stop eating meat, plants would be our only option.  The 
conditions of the agent’s actual world – both social and material – play a large 
part in the determination of ethical constraints.  For Singer, impartiality as the 
proper moral attitude leads to a minimal utilitarianism.  However, impartiality 
already involves a recognition of that set of beings who are to be imaginative 
partners in the moral debate.  Yet, with the seals and plants, the rationality of 
including them in consideration, that is consistency with the principle offered, is 
at too high a cost.  Such groups cannot fit our conceptual scheme.  If they were 
part of our conceptual scheme, then such a scheme would be out of joint with 
actuality.  Impartiality is dependent on the prior recognition, whether actual or by 
proxy, of moral partners.  Recognition is bound to a way of life: the content of 
moral principles is initially drawn from custom, tradition, social institutions and 
practices.  One cannot substantiate moral principles which are too demanding for 
their own time, neither can one leap over Rhodes.  Singer is as aware as Hegel of 
the fact that social and material conditions of existence determine the substantial 
content of formal moral values. 
6 The social context of animal rights in the West 
In resolving the apparent contradiction between Singer’s prescriptivist position 
and his defence of the rationality of the axiomatic principle, equal considerations 
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of interests, his meta-ethical position has been characterised as a minimal 
absolute idealism.  This is the only way in which the claims of the way the world 
is can have a bearing on the rationality of axiomatic prescriptions.  Furthermore, 
he implicitly recognises that the social and material conditions of existence are 
not irrelevant to the demands of morality.  If this is the case, though, a new 
problem arises which perhaps reveals another failing on his part as concerns 
equality.  For no matter how compelling his arguments are, it may not historically 
be the time for man to extend the principle of equality to members of other 
species, not even non-human animals.  To put it in the terminology of absolute 
idealism, the ideas may be rational but they might not yet be actual and they 
remain out of joint with time.  Why might this be and why might Singer not 
acknowledge it?  The answer to the latter is that, perhaps, he is a little too 
Hegelian when he should temper his thought with a little Marx.  This comment 
does, of course, demand clarification and this will hopefully offer an answer the 
first question. 
 
Although Singer’s picture is compelling, his explanation of why the distinction 
between human and animals is still in place does not quite bite.  The reason why 
is because he is, at times, too Hegelian.  Singer supposes that the reason why we 
prescribe more value to humans than to members of other species is to be found 
in the ideology of the Great Chain of Being: it is this traditional way of thinking 
which enforces a hierarchical view of species.  In short, consciousness (ideas) 
determines beings.  Yet, if this were the case, it would be hard to see how 
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democratic, republican, sexual liberation and civil rights have not yet done 
substantial damage to this way of thinking.25   
 
An alternative reason why there is such resistance to rewriting the distinction 
between animals and humans may simply be Marxist rather than Hegelian.  It is 
not consciousness which determines being, but being (the economic structure) 
which determines our ways of thinking.  The food industry alone, if restructured 
along the lines of the new principle of equality, would demand huge economic and 
social restructuring.  Add to this: by-products, connected industries, 
entertainment, differences in the needs of countries due to their environments, 
then the belief that, as long as we get our way of thinking in order, equality will 
pervade is flatly wrong.26  With the Inuit it was necessity which justified the non-
extension of the principle to animals, with us, the non-extension of the principle 
is not explained by the Great Chain of Being, as Singer supposes, but by the 
amount of money and the power of the social institutions involved in industries 
which can only survive if we continue to think of animals as in some way inferior 
to ourselves and tools for own use.  To return once more to Plutarch’s words, if 
there is no necessity, then the madness which directs human reasoning – that is, 
the irrationality at the heart of one’s ontological distinction – is the economic 
system itself and not an outdated ideology.  And if that is the case, and if Singer 
is consistent, then one needs to change the economic base of society through 
action.  Theoretical, abstract ruminations of symptomatic ideology is immaterial 
and incidental. 
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Being and consciousness are, as has been stated, in a reciprocal relationship, 
Singer believes that his principle is more rational and we can agree with him.  
The problem is that the actuality of the world will not fit into his rational scheme 
until the industries dependent on the supposed inferiority of animals are in some 
way made less central to our way of life.  It seems that the only conclusion to be 
made here is a rather radical one.  Singer wants to demonstrate the irrationality 
and arbitrariness of a prescription which determines all humans as equal whilst 
excluding the interests of other species.  The explanation of why such a principle 
is still accepted he finds in the ideology of the Great Chain of Being.  Yet, such an 
ideology would also obstruct the rights of women, non-monarchs, laymen as 
opposed to priests.  These were swept aside in waves which began with the 
Reformation, continued with the Enlightenment and the civil and democratic 
movements of the twentieth century.  Such an ideology is no longer in play but 
was overthrown through revolutionary action and not intellectual reflection.  It 
seems that the ontological distinction between humans and animals is itself a 
symptom of deeper economic necessity: being determines consciousness and not 
vice versa as Singer believes. Revolutionary action aimed at institutions and 
practices which embody such a distinction may be the only way to make the 
world rational, that is make it fit with Singer’s more rational prescription.  This is 
not to endorse such action, but to say that it is the sole way for Singer’s principle 
of equal considerations of interests to become both rational and actual.  As it is, 
 29 
 
 
Between the Species, VIII, August 2008, cla.calpoly.edu/bts/  
 
the actuality of the world resists Singer’s arguments, no matter how compelling 
they are to the mind. 
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no real philosophical work.  Similarly, Williams holds a similar dichotomy into strong and weak 
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not proceed as far as Derrida in holding that no oppositions can be justified, say equality over 
inequality and does not, therefore, commit himself to irrationalism.  See, as a further example of 
Singer’s deconstructive method, his discussion of charity versus duty in ‘Famine, Affluence, and 
Morality’ republished in Unsanctifying Human Life, 2002, pp. 145-156. 
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25 Having discussed this idea informally with North American academics, I may have put this 
point too strongly.  It seems that their students do assume a natural inequality between 
individuals and often refer such beliefs to religious doctrine.  Having had no experience of this, I 
find it impossible to assess, but believe it worth a mention. 
26 Of course, for such an assertion to actually be proven true, one requires empirical figures and 
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